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ABSTRACT 
 
  When components fail it is usually unexpected and the root 
cause is not always known. Downtime from failure can cost a 
company many thousands of dollars a day depending on the 
type of equipment. This cost can be magnified if the equipment 
failure becomes reoccurring. Identifying the root cause for a 
failure is paramount in preventing it from reoccurring. 
Components fail due to a number of reasons such as but not 
limited to improper design, poor material selection, off design 
and poor service conditions. In order to determine why a 
component fails one needs to perform a root cause failure 
analysis (RCFA). A metallurgical analysis is one of the key 
components of a comprehensive RCFA.  
 This paper will outline the stages involved when 
conducting a metallurgical failure analysis. Details on the 
techniques used and the various damage mechanisms observed 
on failed components will also be presented. Other analysis 
used to support a metallurgical examination when conducting a 
comprehensive RCFA will be briefly discussed. Finally, several 
case studies involving failure of turbomachinery components 
will be shown. Subjects will include high temperature corrosion 
on hot gas expander blades and stress corrosion cracking of 
steam turbine disks and compressor impellers. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Failures of turbomachinery such as steam turbines, 
centrifugal compressors and hot gas expanders results in 
significant revenue loss every year.  Costs can be magnified 
further if the failure becomes reoccurring due to not identifying     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the cause of failure.  Paramount to any repair of a failed 
component is identifying the cause and establishing 
actions/procedures to prevent its reoccurrence.   
 Some of the tools utilized to determine a root cause 
include nondestructive testing, metallurgical failure analysis, 
mechanical property testing, stress analysis using finite element 
methodology, frequency and modal testing, fracture mechanics 
methodology, life assessment and other engineering tools as 
needed.  This paper’s primary focus will be on metallurgical 
analysis and steps taken to identify the cause of failure.  Below 
shows the principle stages of a failure analysis [1]. 
 
1. Collection of background data and selection of samples 
2. Preliminary examination of failed part (visual examination 
and record keeping) 
3. Nondestructive testing 
4. Mechanical testing (including hardness and toughness 
testing) 
5. Selection, identification, preservation and/or cleaning of all 
specimens 
6. Macroscopic examination and analysis (fracture surfaces, 
secondary cracks and other surface phenomena) 
7. Microscopic examination and analysis 
8. Selection and preparation of metallographic sections 
9. Examination and analysis of metallographic sections 
10. Determination of failure mechanism 
11. Chemical analyses (bulk, local, surface corrosion products, 
deposits or coatings and microprobe analysis) 
12. Analysis of fracture mechanics 
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13. Testing under simulated service conditions (special tests) 
14. Analysis of all evidence leading to formulation of 
conclusions and writing the report (including 
recommendations). 
 
GATHERING EVIDENCE 
 
 A failure analysis should be treated as a crime scene 
investigation.  It is crucial that failed components and other 
physical evidence are gathered for analysis as soon as possible.  
The longer the time between failure and investigation the 
chance for contamination or damage of the components 
increases.  Failed components should be stored in a clean and 
dry location.  The broken sections should not be fitted back 
together as this can damage the fracture surfaces.  Cleaning 
processes of any kind should be avoided as this removes vital 
evidence to the investigation.  Figure 1 shows a steam turbine 
blade failure that was blast cleaned which severely hampered 
the investigation.   
 
 
Figure 1. Blast cleaned steam turbine blade which removed all 
identifiable features 
 
 Photographs should be taken of the component following 
failure as soon as possible.  In the digital age photographs are 
inexpensive so more is better.  Vital information or evidence 
maybe contained in an early post failure photo.  This is 
especially helpful to the metallurgist since they usually do not 
get to visit the site early post failure.  Fractured components 
should be safely packaged and sent to a metallurgical lab for 
analysis.  Additional evidence such as deposits and components 
that have not fractured should be collected for analysis as well.   
 Outside the scope of the metallurgist but vital to a failure 
investigation is a review of operating history.  A qualified 
engineer should review provided data to determine that a unit is 
running at the recommended design conditions.  Operating 
outside of design conditions can result in stresses and 
environmental conditions that could facilitate a failure.  This 
type of analysis is heavily dependent on the thoroughness of the 
operational data provided. 
 
METALLURGICAL EXAMINATION 
 
Visual Examination 
 
 Upon receipt all components are visually inspected and 
photo documented. While not as powerful as a microscope, the 
naked eye can observe much larger areas for a better 
understanding of the overall picture.  Dimensional checks 
should be performed to verify drawing requirements are met, if 
available.   
 
Nondestructive Examination  
 
 All parts with no apparent cracks of fractures should be 
subjected to Nondestructive examination (NDE).  Cracks that 
are discovered away from the main fracture can sometimes be 
more informative.  These types of cracks usually occur due to 
the same damage mechanism as the main fracture and are in an 
earlier stage of failure.  The most common NDE techniques 
used in conjunction with a metallurgical analysis are magnetic 
particle and liquid penetrant inspection.  Figure 2 shows 
additional cracks away from the main fracture on an impeller 
during magnetic particle inspection. 
 
 
Figure 2. Cracking discovered during magnetic particle 
inspection of centrifugal compressor impeller  
 
Microstructure, Mechanical and Chemical Testing 
 
 If the available material allows, failed components should 
undergo mechanical testing to verify the material meets design 
specifications.  Mechanical testing usually involves tensile 
testing, hardness, and if necessary charpy impacts.  These tests 
verify that the component has adequate mechanical properties 
for the operating conditions.  Chemical testing is used to justify 
the components elemental constituents.  This information is 
then compared to the material specification of the component 
for acceptability.  A microstructural cross-section is taken to 
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verify the material is in the correct heat treated condition.  
Figure 3 shows the correct quench and tempered condition of a 
steam turbine blade.  The main purpose of these tests is to 
eliminate a material issue as the cause of failure.   
 
 
Figure 3. Quenched and tempered microstructure of AISI 403 
Steam turbine blade 
 
  Failure Mechanism 
 
 Key to any metallurgical analysis is identifying the failure 
mechanism of the component.  In turbomachinery, failures 
most commonly occur by one or a combination of the following 
mechanisms: 
 
 Fatigue – high cycle or low cycle 
 Environmentally assisted – Corrosion / 
Corrosion Fatigue / Stress Corrosion 
Cracking (SCC) 
 Erosion – solid particle or liquid 
impingement 
 Creep Rupture / Creep Fatigue 
 High Temperature Corrosion/Embrittlement  
 Mechanical (foreign object) Damage 
 
The identification of the failure mechanism is accomplished by 
analyzing the fracture surface under stereoscopic and scanning 
electron microscope (SEM).  Depending on the material, each 
failure mechanism exhibits characteristics that can be used for 
its identification.  The following describes these mechanisms 
and their observed characteristics on failed turbomachinery.  
           
 Fatigue 
 
 Fatigue is the progressive localized permanent structural 
change that occurs in a material subjected to repeated or 
fluctuating strains at stresses having a maximum value less than 
the tensile strength of the material [1].  Therefore failures that 
occur under cyclic loading are termed fatigue failures.  These 
can be vibration stresses on blades, alternating bending loads 
on shafts, fluctuating thermal stresses during start-stop cycles, 
etc.  There are two types of fatigue: low cycle fatigue (LCF) 
and high cycle fatigue (HCF). Traditionally, low cycle fatigue 
failure is classified occurring below 104 cycles, and high cycle 
fatigue is above that number.  An important distinction between 
HCF and LCF is that in HCF most of the fatigue life is spent in 
crack initiation, whereas in LCF most of the life is spent in 
crack propagation because cracks are found to initiate within 
three to 10 percent of the fatigue life. HCF is usually associated 
with lower stress, while LCF usually occurs under higher stress. 
 Most failures of rotating turbomachinery are due to high 
cycle fatigue.  These failures generally occur at loads that when 
applied statically would produce little affect.  Fatigue occurs in 
three stages: 
 
I) Crack initiation 
II) Crack propagation 
III) Final fracture overload 
 
 Fatigue is a particularly insidious failure mechanism.  A 
fatigue failure spends 80-90% of its life in crack initiation.  
This means a fatigue crack is not detectable by NDE inspection 
until the crack propagation stage which is the last 10-20% of its 
life.  A component can be reaching the end of its life and yet 
show no physical evidence in which to identify impending 
failure.  Typical fatigue fractures are relatively flat and smooth 
and in some cases show beachmarks that indicate successive 
positions of the advancing crack tip.  Fatigue is most commonly 
transgranular with striations, which each one indicates a single 
cycle of stress.  Figure 4 shows a steam turbine blade with 
typical high cycle fatigue fracture features.  
 
Figure 4. High cycle fatigue failure of steam turbine airfoil 
 
 Corrosion Fatigue and Stress Corrosion Cracking 
 
 Corrosion fatigue is the combined action of repeated or 
fluctuating stress and a corrosive environment to produce 
 
Copyright© 2018 by Turbomachinery Laboratory, Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station 
 
cracking [1].  The corrosion is typically localized and takes the 
form of pitting.  These pits act as stress risers and when 
combined with an alternating stress can lead to a fatigue failure.  
Figure 5 shows a pit from which a fatigue crack is propagating.  
Corrosion fatigue can occur on both steam turbines and 
compressors but is more commonly seen on steam turbine 
blades.  Figure 6 shows a steam turbine blade failure that 
initiated from a corrosion pit.   
 
 
Figure 5. Fatigue crack propagating from corrosion pit 
 
 
Figure 6. Corrosion pit at initiation of steam turbine blade 
fatigue failure 
 
 Stress Corrosion Cracking is a mechanical-environmental 
failure process in which sustained tensile stress and chemical 
attack combine to initiate and propagate fracture in a metal part 
[1].  Therefore in order for SCC to occur three variables are 
required: 
 
1) Tensile stress  
2) Corrosive environment 
3) Susceptible material 
 
Removal of any one of the above variables will prevent SCC 
from occurring.  SCC usually initiates at stress risers such as 
pits due to the high peak stresses present.  However, the 
absence of pits does not exclude the possibility the failure 
mechanism was SCC.  SCC can be transgranular or 
intergranular depending on the material and the corrosion 
media.  Cracks typically appear branched but can be straight 
depending on the applied stress involved.  Both steam turbines 
and centrifugal compressors can be subjected to SCC.  
Unwanted carryover contaminants can lead to SCC in high 
stressed components such as impellers and steam turbine 
blades/disks.  Figure 7 shows transgranular SCC of a 
centrifugal compressor impeller due to chlorides. 
 
 
Figure 7. Transgranular SCC of impeller due to chlorides  
 
 SCC is of particular concern on last stage steam turbine 
disks and blades.  Blades are typically manufactured from 12Cr 
martensitic stainless steel such as AISI 403 which can be 
susceptible to corrosion in a chloride environment.  Chlorides 
such as NaCl can lead to pitting and SCC of steam turbine 
blades.  Sodium Sulfite (Na2SO3) is used as an oxygen 
scavenger but has the potential to decompose into hydrogen 
sulfide.  Hydrogen sulfide is a corrosive compound that can 
lead to sulfide stress cracking and promote hydrogen 
embrittlement (Figure 8).   
       
 
Figure 8. SEM micrograph of intergranular corrosion cracking 
of steam turbine blade 
 
 SCC is most commonly seen on steam turbine disk blade 
root attachments.  The low alloy steels of steam turbine rotors 
are susceptible to SCC in the presence of hydroxides such as 
NaOH.  The crack morphology of SCC on rotor materials is 
typically always intergranular (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9. SEM micrograph of intergranular SCC of steam 
turbine disk 
 
 Erosion – Liquid or Solid Particle 
 
 Erosion is a loss of material due to mechanical interaction 
between the surface and liquids or particles.  The 
liquids/particles when accelerated in steam or process gas can 
impact components resulting in the removal of small amounts 
of material.  Eventually pits and microcracks form at the 
surface.  When cyclic stresses are present the pits and 
microcracks will create stress concentrations from which 
fatigue cracks can initiate [2].   
 Erosion is particularly problematic for steam turbine 
blades.  Steam turbines operate at higher temperatures and with 
a more closed gas path compared to centrifugal compressors.  
Solid particle erosion can occur on steam turbine blades due to 
the exfoliation of scales from piping during transient conditions 
(Figure 10).  As the latter stages of a steam turbine increase in 
wetness the blades become susceptible to liquid droplet erosion.  
The damage typically takes the form of removal of material 
from the blade leading edge (Figure 11).  Compressor impeller 
and hot gas expander blades can also experience erosion 
damage as well (Figures 12&13).   
 
 
Figure 10.  Solid particle erosion of steam turbine blades due 
to exfoliation of upstream piping/boiler scale 
 
 
Figure 11.  Liquid droplet erosion of last stage blades due to 
excessive moisture 
 
 
Figure 12. Erosion at discharge of impeller blade  
 
 
Figure 13. Primary erosion of hot gas expander blades 
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 Creep  
 
 Creep is time dependent strain occurring under stress.  
After a period of time, creep may terminate in fracture by creep 
rupture [1].  In turbomachinery, creep is a concern on 
components which operate under stress at high temperatures.  
Evidence of creep damage in the high temperature regions of 
blade attachment areas of turbine rotors has been observed [3].  
Creep damage takes the form of isolated then oriented cavities 
which link up to form cracks (Figure 14).  Figure 15 shows 
isolated creep cavities in the weld of the nose cone strut on the 
inlet casing of a hot gas expander.   
 
 
Figure 14. Stages of creep damage 
 
 
Figure 15. Oriented creep cavities in nose cone strut weld 
metal of expander inlet casing   
 
 High Temperature Corrosion 
 
 Fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) hot gas expanders operate 
in environments that can be both corrosive and erosive.  
Although it is well documented that the source of erosion 
comes from the regenerated catalyst that is carried with the hot 
flue gas from the FCC, its effect on high temperature corrosion 
is not well documented.   
 The nature of the corrosion attack is primarily influenced 
by the type of crude oil stock, which in time has a bearing on 
the resulting flue gas composition, regenerated catalyst and the 
nature and quality of additions injected into the FCC process.  
Blades that are subjected to partially combusted flue gas can 
develop oxide wedges in the root.  The formation of oxide 
wedges plays a pivotal role in the fracture of expander blades.  
Oxide wedges typically occur in the upper root land on the high 
pressure side of the blade (Figure 16).  Oxide wedge formation 
is a form of oxidation/sulfidation damage related to the 
repeated crack nucleation and growth of the corrosion layer at 
the oxide wedge tip.  Eventually the oxide wedge grows to a 
critical size from which a fatigue crack can initiate.  Papers 
published by Dowson Rishel and Stinner outline the 
relationship of stress and temperature on the high temperature 
corrosion/fracture mechanics of Waspaloy in various catalyst 
environments[4][5].    
 
 
Figure 16.  Cross-section of expander blade indicating the 
presence of an oxide wedge in the root 
 
 Mechanical Damage 
 
 Mechanical damage is caused by foreign objects that have 
entered the gas/steam path.  Foreign objects in the gas/steam 
path will eventually come into contact with rotating 
components.  The resulting impacts can exceed the yield 
strength of a material and cause an overload failure (Figure 17).  
However, typically the damage from these impacts does not 
directly result in failure but weakens the material which 
eventually leads to a fatigue failure.  
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Figure 17. SEM micrograph of steam turbine blade overload 
failure due to foreign object impact 
 
REPORT CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Determining the mode of failure is only the initial phase in 
the failure analysis. To get to the root cause of the failure a 
rigorous evaluation of the information is required with input 
from design engineers, materials engineers and process 
engineers etc. It is not enough to determine the mode of failure 
only. Why a component failed by a certain mechanism is the 
goal of any failure analysis.  The evidence to determine a 
conclusive root cause can be contained in the failed 
components themselves.  In these cases a metallurgical analysis 
is all that is necessary to bring a failure analysis to its final 
conclusions.  However, as mentioned previously further 
analysis involving finite element analysis, modal and frequency 
testing, fracture mechanics etc. are necessary to provide 
supporting evidence for a conclusive root cause.       
 
CASE STUDY 1    
 
Introduction 
 
 Hot gas expander rotor experienced a single blade failure 
resulting in unit shutdown. The operating time of this rotor was 
approximately 54,000 hours.  The request was made for a 
metallurgical failure analysis of the failed rotor.  
      
Metallurgical Examination  
 
 Visual Examination 
 
 Initial inspection of the failed rotor indicated a single blade 
failure at the top fir-tree radius in the blade root section (Figure 
18).  All the blades were numbered in the clockwise direction 
on the inlet face prior to disassembly starting at failed blade #1.  
The blades were packaged and sent for metallurgical 
examination.   
 
 
Figure 18.  Failed blade fracture surface prior to disassembly 
 
 The blades were Non-Destructive Examined (NDE) by 
fluorescent penetrant and no indications were observed.  There 
was evidence of heavy rubbing on the blade tips of all the 
blades due to catalyst building up on the shroud (Figure 19). 
 
 
Figure 19. Blade rubbing on the airfoil tips 
 
 Chemical and Mechanical Testing 
 
 Several blades were sectioned for chemical and mechanical 
testing.  The chemical properties of the blade material were 
within material specifications for Waspaloy.  The mechanical 
test at 1000°F met the requirements for tensile and yield 
strength.  The hardness value conformed to the requirements of 
Waspaloy material. 
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  Fracture Analysis   
 
  Optical Examination 
 
 The appearance of the fracture surface of blade #1 is 
shown in Figure 20.  The failure appeared to have initiated 
midway at the top fir-tree radius on the pressure side of the 
blade root section.  Examination of the fracture surface 
indicated after initiating the crack propagated through the blade 
until overload failure at the discharge side of the blade.  
Located at the point of initiation were flat and smooth areas 
which are explained in more detail in the Scanning Electron 
Microscope (SEM) section (Figure 21).  These flat and smooth 
areas were apparent over the crack surface inboard from the top 
fir tree radius.  The fracture surface immediately after the flat 
and smooth areas had a rough appearance shown at high 
magnification in Figure 22.   
 
 
Figure 20.  Fracture surface of failed blade 
 
 
Figure 21.  Flat and smooth like areas at the point of initiation 
inboard from the top fir-tree radius 
 
Figure 22.  Initiation area at high magnification showing a 
rough surface appearance 
 
  SEM Examination    
 
 The flat and smooth areas at the initiation which were 
identified optically showed a brittle appearance when examined 
under the SEM.  Figure 23 showing the area of deepest 
penetration, which was 17.11 mils.  These areas of deep 
penetration were observed at approximately 1.25 inches from 
the discharge side.  Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS) 
analysis of these areas at the initiation showed the major 
elements present to be Chromium, Oxygen and Sulfur (Figure 
24).  This indicated the areas were composed of Chromium 
Oxide and Chromium Sulfide.  X-Ray mapping verified that 
this area consisted of Chromium Oxide and Chromium Sulfide 
(Figure 25).  Note the reduction of Nickel on this area 
compared to the rest of the fracture surface.       
 
 
Figure 23.  Flat and smooth area examined under SEM  
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Figure 24.  EDS analysis indicating the presence of Chromium 
Oxide and Chromium Sulfide 
Figure 25.  X-ray mapping of  area in Figure 23 showing the 
concentration of the elements.  Note the lack of Nickel (Green) 
in at this area. 
 
 After stripping using acetate tape some small intergranular 
areas could be seen near the initiation point (Figure 26).  
Further away from the point of initiation in which the surface is 
less obscured the crack propagation had an intergranular 
appearance (Figure 27).  The crack propagated in an 
intergranular manner through most of the blade until final 
overload which showed dimple rupture (Figure 28).  Final 
overload occurred near the discharge side on the non-pressure 
side of the blade.  
 
Figure 26.  Stripping the surface with acetate tape revealed 
intergranular features 
 
 
Figure 27. Crack propagation into the blade was intergranular 
 
 
Figure 28.  Area of ductile overload and final fracture 
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Intact Blade Cross Sections 
 
 Several blades were cross-sectioned through the root to 
determine if the remaining blades exhibited the same 
Oxide/Sulfide attack as seen on the failed blade.  The manner in 
which the blades were cross-sectioned is shown in Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29.  Area of blade cross sections 
 
The cross-sections of blades approximately 1.25 inches from 
the discharge side showed evidence of oxide wedges.  An oxide 
wedge can clearly be seen at the top root radius on the pressure 
side of the blade (Figure 30).  High magnification of the oxide 
wedge revealed its length to be 11.64 mils.  X-Ray mapping of 
the oxide wedge indicated the presence of the same elements as 
seen on the flat and smooth areas at the initiation of the failed 
blade.  The oxide wedge mainly consisted of Chromium, 
Oxygen and Sulfur which suggest Chromium Oxide and 
Chromium Sulfide.  In the center of the wedge was a vein rich 
in Nickel and Sulfur (Figure 31).  Figures 32 & 33 show oxide 
wedges on other blades approximately 1.25 inches from the 
discharge side.  The largest oxide wedge of 16.84 mils was 
found in a blade which was two blades away from the one that 
failed.  A SEM micrograph of a cross-section of another blade 
revealed two oxide wedges in their infancy (Figure 34).  Figure 
34 illustrates how as the oxide cracks it exposes the base metal 
to the corrosive environment promoting deeper growth of the 
oxide wedges.  
 
 
Figure 30.  Cross-section indicating an oxide wedge 
 
Figure 31.  X-ray mapping of the oxide wedge  
 
 
Figure 32.  Oxide wedge found on a non-failed blade at 1.25” 
from the discharge side of the root 
 
 
Figure 33.  Oxide wedge found on non-failed blade at 1.25” 
from the discharge side of the root 
 
Copyright© 2018 by Turbomachinery Laboratory, Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station 
  
Figure 34. Early stage of oxide wedges  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 The failure of the blade was due to corrosion fatigue that 
initiated at the top fir-tree radius on the pressure side.  Initiation 
occurred due to high temperature corrosion attack and 
penetration indicating a corrosion assisted process.  Sulfur can 
embrittle Nickel based superalloys as it penetrates down the 
grain boundaries.  The intergranular propagation of the crack 
along the fracture surface supports a corrosion fatigue damage 
mechanism.  The corrosion media in this case is obviously 
Sulfur.  No material deficiency was found that could have 
initiated the failure.     
 Cross-sections of the top fir-tree radius of several intact 
blades showed evidence of oxide wedges.  The size and depth 
of the oxide wedges varied along the blade with the largest 
being located approximately 1.25 inches from the discharge 
side.  The point of initiation of the failed blade is approximately 
1.25 inches.  Oxide wedges form due to repeated crack 
nucleation and growth of the oxide layer at the oxide wedge tip.  
The rupture of the oxide at the wedge tip exposes the base 
metal to the corrosive environment which promotes further 
growth.  These oxide wedges would have given rise to a 
significant stress concentration.  It is this stress riser that 
initiates the crack and it is the continuing diffusion of the Sulfur 
into the base metal that propagates the crack under a corrosion 
fatigue mechanism.   
 The rubbing of the blade tips is a major contributor to the 
failure and should not be overlooked.  The formation of oxide 
wedges is a function of the temperature, environment and 
stress.  It has been observed during experimental testing and 
from past failures that an increase in the stress magnitude, 
whether static or dynamic, in a hot corrosive environment can 
result in sharp oxide wedges.  The application of dynamic 
stresses compared to static stresses of the same magnitude tends 
to increase the penetration of the oxide wedges.  The rubbing of 
the blade tips caused fretting at the contact points that 
contributed to the breakdown of the protected diffusion coating.  
The chromized coating applied to the blades should have 
protected this form of corrosive attack.  However, the repeated 
rubbing of the blades against the catalyst resulted in a dynamic 
stress being applied in the blade roots.  This dynamic stress 
diminished the effectiveness of the coating exposing the virgin 
Waspaloy material to hot corrosive attack.  Since catalyst 
buildup on the shroud is a major contributor to the blade tips 
rubbing, every effort should be made to minimize the rubbing.  
Application of walnut shells and/or thermal cycling of the hot 
gas expander can assist in removing catalyst buildup before any 
future blade rubs occur, with minimal operating interruptions.   
 Due to the results of this metallurgical analysis, 
replacement of the disk as well as the blades was 
recommended.  The stresses at the top fir-tree radius of the disk 
and blade root are very similar.  This top fir-tree radius of the 
disk would have been exposed to the same operating 
temperature that promoted the formation of oxide wedges in the 
blade roots.  Therefore, it was reasonable to assume that the 
disk would have experienced the same high temperature 
corrosion attack that occurred on the blades.  Application of 
current NDE penetrant technologies cannot detect these oxide 
wedges due to the indications being filled with corrosive oxide 
deposits.     
 
CASE STUDY 2 
 
Background  
 
The subject steam turbine experienced a 4th stage disk rim 
failure near the locking pin location (Figure 35).  The subject 
steam turbine was made from Chromium-Nickel-Molybdenum-
Vanadium alloy steel, ASTM A470 Grade C Class 7.  The rim 
was parted from the main body of the disk and sent for 
metallurgical analysis.   
 
 
Figure 35.  As received condition of the 4th stage failure 
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Metallurgical Examination 
 
 The fracture surface of the disk rim was carefully 
examined and it appeared at first glance to be a fatigue failure. 
However, upon further examination it was determined that 
stress corrosion cracking (SCC) was the actual failure 
mechanism.  The details of this analysis are summarized in the 
following.   
 Visual examination revealed additional cracking on the 
disk rim other than the main fracture.  The additional cracks 
were cross-sectioned and polished.  Evidence of cracking was 
observed initiating from three of the four fir-tree root radii.  
Examination under a high powered microscope indicated the 
cracks were intergranular and initiated from corrosion pits 
(Figure 36).   
 
 
Figure 36. Corrosion pits from which the SCC initiated 
 
 Microstructure examination of the cracked disk rim area 
presented evidence of two different microstructures (Figure 
37).  Area A consisted of a fine grained untempered martensitic 
structure with a hardness of 42 HRC (Figure 38).  This value of 
42 HRC represents a significant increase in hardness compared 
to ASTM A470 Grade C Class 7 rotor forging specifications.   
Area B consists of tempered martensite and bainitic 
microstructure with a hardness of 26 HRC (Figure 39).  Area B 
is more typical of an ASTM A470 Grade C Class 7 rotor 
forging.  A cross-section of the disk rim with no evidence of 
cracking is shown in Figure 40.  The entire cross-section 
exhibited a tempered martensite and bainitic microstructure 
with a hardness of 26 HRC (Figure 41).   
 
Figure 37. Two different microstructures after etching 
 
 
Figure 38. Fine grained untempered microstructure of area A  
 
 
Figure 39. Tempered martensitic and bainitic microstructure of 
area B 
Pits 
A 
B 
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Figure 40.  Cross-section near the fracture with no cracks 
 
 
Figure 41. Cross-section in Figure 40 consists of a martensitic 
and bainitic microstructure 
 
 The fracture surface was examined in detail using a 
scanning electron microscope (SEM).  All locations exhibited 
the same intergranular fracture surface features which is typical 
of SCC on steam turbine rotor material (Figures 42).   
 
 
Figure 42.  SEM micrograph showing typical intergranular 
features of SCC 
 Energy dispersion spectroscopy (EDS) of the corrosion pits 
revealed evidence of chemical contaminants.  Elements such as 
K, S, Cl and Na were found and are well known to cause SCC 
(Figure 43).  EDS and chemical analysis indicated the disk rim 
material was from an ASTM A470 Grade C Class 7 rotor 
forging.   
 
 
Figure 43.  EDS analysis of corrosion pit indicating the 
presence of chemical contaminants. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 The failure mechanism of the subject disk rim was SCC.  
The chemistry of the disk rim complied with ASTM A470 
Grade C Class 7 material requirements.  However, there was a 
significant difference in microstructure and hardness between 
the areas of the rim with SCC and the areas without SCC.  SCC 
only occurred in the areas with the high hardness.  The cause of 
the SCC failure was due to a combination of high hardness 
material and corrosive chemical contaminants.  The high 
hardness in the locking pin area of the disk rim would have 
made the material more susceptible to SCC.   
 The most likely cause of the high hardness is the 
application of high temperature to this area.  If the material was 
heated to a temperature over its Ac1 temperature then it would 
harden upon cooling.  Ac1 is the temperature in which austenite 
begins to form upon heating which depending on the cooling 
rate can form hard phases such as untempered martensite.   If 
not followed by a tempering heat treatment then this hardness 
would remain high.  How and when this area experienced this 
high temperature is unknown.   However, the localized area of 
the high hardness and the fact the blades obscure the disk rim 
suggests it is unlikely the high hardness is the result of a rub 
during service.      
 It is unlikely the disk rim would have failed without the 
high hardness of the material and therefore a weld repair of the 
disk rim is recommended.  The hardness value of the weld 
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repaired disk rim after post weld heat treatment will be 
significantly less than 42 HRC.  Therefore, the risk of failure by 
SCC will be significantly reduced.  It is also recommended, if 
possible, that an effort be made to reduce the chemical 
contaminants in the steam.  While not the sole cause of failure, 
the contaminants were a contributing factor.   
 
CASE STUDY 3 
 
Background 
 
 The subject three stage compressor was shut down due to 
high vibration.  During disassembly of the compressor it was 
observed that a section of the first stage impeller cover at the 
eye seal area was missing (Figure 44).  A heavy deposit was 
observed in the gas path of all three impellers (Figure 45).  The 
deposits were removed from all three impellers and bagged for 
future analysis.   
 
 
Figure 44.  Fractured impeller on the rotor 
 
 
Figure 45.  Heavy deposits observed in the gas path 
Metallurgical Examination 
 
 Visual Examination 
 
Visual examination revealed additional cracking near the eye 
seal area of the impeller (Figure 46).  Heavy hard deposits were 
observed at the blade to cover transition radius (Figure 47).  
The heavy hard deposits appear to coincide with the location of 
the cracking on the cover.   
 
 
Figure 46.  Additional cracks observed near the eye seal area 
 
 
Figure 47. Heavy and hard deposits observed at the blade to 
cover transition radius 
Cover 
Eye 
Blade 
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 After visual examination the impeller was magnetic 
particle inspected for additional cracking.  During magnetic 
particle inspection it was observed that the majority of the 
cover eye seal area had crack indications near the blade to 
cover transition locations.   
 
 Deposit Analysis 
 
 Deposits collected from the first, second and third stages 
were analyzed in the scanning electron microscope (SEM) to 
determine its constituent elements.  Energy dispersive 
spectroscopy (EDS) analysis of the deposits revealed the 
presence of Sodium(Na), Magnesium(Mg), Aluminium(Al), 
Silicon(Si), Sulfur(S), Chlorine(Cl), and Potassium(K) (Figure 
48).  Deposits on the fracture surface of the first stage impeller 
revealed the presence of the same corrosive constituents.   
 
 
Figure 48.  EDS analysis deposit presenting evidence of 
corrosive contaminants 
 
 Cover Crack Analysis 
 
 Cross-sections were taken through the cracks on the cover 
near the eye seal area (Figure 49).  The initiation of the cracks 
occurs inside the gas path and propagates towards the outside 
surface.  Observations after polishing indicated the presence of 
multiple pits inside the gas path of the cover (Figure 50).  The 
cracks all initiated at pits such as shown in Figure 51.  Further 
observation of the cracks revealed significant branching which 
is an indication of environmental corrosive attack (Figure 52).  
Electrolytic etching the samples verified that the cracking was 
transgranular morphology (Figure 53).  
 
Figure 49. Cross-sections showing cracks initiate inside the gas 
path and propagate towards the outside surface 
 
 
Figure 50. Multiple pits observed inside the gas path of the 
cover 
 
 
Figure 51.  Initiation of the cracks occurred at corrosion pits 
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Figure 52. Significant branching was observed which is a 
indication of corrosive attack  
 
 
Figure 53. Transgranular morphology during crack 
propagation 
 
 The cross-sections were examined in the SEM using X-ray 
mapping to determine the corrosion contaminants inside the 
cracks.  Observations of smaller tighter cracks that had not 
opened up indicated the presence of chlorides (Figure 54).  This 
indicates that the cracking is most likely due to chlorides  
 
Figure 54. Smaller tighter cracks indicated the presence of 
chlorides(Cl) (Light Blue) 
 Microstructure, Hardness and Chemistry 
 
 The microstructure of the impeller material consisted of 
tempered martensite.  Chemical analysis of the impeller 
indicated the material was a 15-5PH stainless steel.  The 
microstructure, hardness and chemistry of the impeller material 
were within Specifications.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 The failure of the first stage impeller was by stress 
corrosion cracking (SCC) due to the presence of chlorides.  The 
stress corrosion cracking was observed at the eye seal area near 
the cover to blade transition radius.  The cracks initiate inside 
the gas path of the cover and propagated towards the outside 
surface.  All materials were verified to be within specifications 
and there was no evidence that the cause of failure was due to a 
material deficiency.   
 The heavy deposits found on the rotor may have 
contributed to the failure.  The cover to blade transition radius 
is one of the highest stressed locations on the impeller.  The 
failure could have occurred due to the presence of the chloride 
environment combined with a high tensile stress.  However, the 
deposits may have resulted in extremely low amounts of 
oxygen for the stainless steel to form its protective oxide.  This 
will result in a localized form of attack called crevice corrosion.  
This would have resulted in the pits which would have 
compounded the crevice corrosion and allowed for the 
initiation of SCC.  Silica can create hard deposits that will not 
wash off and large amounts of silicon were found during EDS 
analysis.   
  Precipitation hardened stainless steel such as 15-5PH, 
which the first stage was manufactured can be subject to 
pitting, crevice corrosion, and SCC in chloride containing 
environments.  If it is not possible to remove the contaminants 
from the process gas then it may be advisable to change the 
impeller to a material more resistant to chlorides.  Age 
hardened Inconel alloy 725 has superior resistance to SCC in a 
chloride environment compared to precipitation hardened 
stainless steel.  A more corrosion resistant material would be a 
directional improvement.  However, the ultimate solution is to 
remove the contaminants from the process gas.        
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 A review of the various stages of a metallurgical failure 
analysis has been presented.  Also presented are several case 
studies illustrating the application of the techniques involved.  
By conducting a failure analysis one can identify a root cause 
for fractured components and implement procedures to prevent 
their reoccurrence.    
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